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I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and
an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic
ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is
satisfied. The principal commits, while the agent’s type evolution follows a
Markov process. My results demonstrate, even when allowing for potential
correlation of stochastic contracts across periods that the usual restriction
in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the
first-order approach is valid.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in dynamic mechanism de-
sign, e.g. Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Pavan et al. (2009), Kapicka
(2010), Gershkov and Perry (2012), Eső and Szentes (2013), Li and Shi (2013),
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Pavan et al. (2014), Battaglini and Lamba (2017), Deb and Said (2015) and
Krähmer and Strausz (2015) discuss this issue. All these papers, however, restrict
to deterministic mechanisms accepting that this assumption is often with loss of
generality. Moreover, most of these papers use the local approach to characterize
optimal mechanisms, the so-called first-order approach, which means that only
local downward binding IC-constraints have to be taken into account.
Extending Strausz (2006) to a dynamic framework, I show that the ad hoc re-
striction to deterministic contracts is without loss valid if the first-order approach
is valid.
The extension is not immediate, because stochastic mechanisms in a dynamic
framework also allow for intertemporal correlation, an issue which in a static
framework does not arise.1
2 Model
There are two players, a principal and an agent. In each period t ∈ T :=
{1, . . . , T}, T > 2,2 the agent consumes a quantity qt ∈ R+ at some price pt ∈ R.
This generates a per-period utility of u(θt, qt) − pt for the agent, where θt ∈
Θ := {θN , . . . , θ0} ⊂ R represents agent’s type in period t ∈ T . I follow the
standard assumptions in the literature that u is twice continuously differentiable
in both arguments, increasing in both arguments, with u(·, 0) = 0, is concave in
qt and satisfies the single crossing condition, i.e. marginal utility is higher for
higher types. The principal produces qt given a cost function c(qt). This function
fulfills as well usual conditions. There are no fixed costs, it is twice continuously
differentiable, increasing and convex. To guarantee an interior solution, I assume
that marginal costs vanish at 0 and tend to infinity if the quantity tends to
infinity.
In the first period, the principal commits to a long term contract to the agent
who has the opportunity to accept or reject it. In every later period t ∈ T \{1}, he
decides to continue or to terminate the relationship. Once the agent terminates
1Pavan et al. (2014) in Corollary 2 (iv) mention without formal proof that results of Strausz
(2006) imply an optimality of deterministic contracts, but they neglect the possibility of in-
tertemporal correlation.
2It is not important for the analysis if T is finite or not. The results still hold for T = ∞,
the proofs become however more extensive.
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the contract, he has no possibility to rejoin the contract.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
For notational convenience, I assume that agent’s types are equidistant, i.e. ∆θ :=
θi−1 − θi > 0 for all i ∈ I\{0}, where I := {0, . . . , N} is the set of all indices of
types.3 The initial type of the agent is chosen from a prior distribution f(θi) =:
µi ∈ ]0, 1[ for all i ∈ I, with
∑
i∈I µi = 1, which is common knowledge. Its
cumulative distribution function is therefore F (θi) =
∑N
j=i µj, for all i ∈ I. In all
later periods the type changes according to a Markov process. The probability
that the agent’s type changes from θi to θj is given through f(θj|θi) =: αij ∈ ]0, 1[,
for all i, j ∈ I and for every period t ∈ T . This reflects the Markov property
of independence regarding time and earlier types. It fulfills
∑N
j=0 αij = 1, for
all i ∈ I and for simplicity, I assume full support of the conditional distribution,
i.e. αij > 0 for all i, j ∈ I. The corresponding cumulative distribution function
F is given through F (θk|θi) =
∑N
j=k αij, for all i, k ∈ I. I also follow the usual
convention of first order stochastic dominance, i.e. F (θk|θi) > F (θk|θi−1) or
0 ≤ ∆F (θk|θi) := F (θk|θi)− F (θk|θi−1), for all k ∈ I and all i ∈ I\{0}.
In the following, I use the notation θt to characterize the agent’s type in
period t ∈ T .4 Moreover, let θt ∈ Θt be the evolution vector θt := (θ1, . . . , θt)
of agent’s types from period 1 up to period t, for all t ∈ T . The whole type
path is denoted by θ := θT ∈ ΘT . In addition, let Θt+τ (θt) := {ϑt+τ ∈ Θt+τ :
ϑs = θs, ∀ 1 6 s 6 t}, for all t ∈ T , all θ
t ∈ Θt and all 0 6 τ 6 T − t.
Furthermore, let qt := (q1, . . . , qt) ∈ R
t
+ be the vector of quantity realizations
and pt := (p1, . . . , pt) ∈ R
t the price-vector with pt = p(qt), each from period 1
up to period t ∈ T , where q := qT , p := pT are the corresponding vectors over
the whole time horizon T . By the revelation principle, it suffices that qt and pt
depend on the current report θt and earlier reports and realizations. Recursively,
one can denote qt as the occurred realization of q(θt|q
t−1, θt−1) for all t ∈ T ,
whereby q0, θ0 ∈ ∅.
3As in Strausz (2006), I assume a finite number of types to circumvent measure theoretical
complications.
4The notation θt characterizes the stochastic process of agent’s type which takes values in
Θ, whereas θi specifies a possible event of agent’s type in any period. Therefore, expressions
like θ1 are ambiguous, but it should become clear in the specific situation.
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2.2 Stochastic contracts
In order to represent stochastic contracts, I distinguish between the realized quan-
tity qt and the random variable q(θt|h
t−1), which depends on agent’s report θt
in the current period and the history ht−1 of previous reports θt−1 and quantity
realizations qt−1. Here, I use ht := (θt, qt) the history of previous types and oc-
curred realizations with ht ∈ H t := Θt × Rt+, for all t ∈ T and let h
0 ∈ H0 := ∅.
Therefore, q(θt|h
t−1) defines on the image space (R+,B(R+)) the implementation
function
ξ(·|ht−1, θt) : R+ −→ [0, 1],
ξ(qt|h
t−1, θt) = P(q 6 qt|h
t−1, θt),
for all qt ∈ R+.
Indeed, the principal can choose the weights of possible outcomes over R+
of the implementation function depending on the history of type reports θt−1,
the current report θt and the history of previous realized quantities q
t−1. This,
however, creates in addition to the reports of agent’s type, a second uninforma-
tive channel for both, the agent and the principal.5 Furthermore, it allows for





which illustrates the dependence of ξ of current and previous reports. With
Bayes’ rule and the fact that qt−1 is independent of θt one obtains
dξθt(qt|q
t−1) . . . dξθ1(q1) = dξθt(q
t),
for all t ∈ T . Hence, ξθ reflects the implementation function of the whole alloca-
tion vector q ∈ RT+.
5I assume that prices p(qt) are deterministic, which is due to quasi-linear utilities without
loss of generality.
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2.3 Agent’s continuation utility
After signing the contract, the agent receives in every period t ∈ T a quantity
qt ∈ R+ chosen from a lottery for a price pt ∈ R. Moreover, he discounts future
utilities by δ ∈]0, 1[. Therefore, one can define his continuation utility recursively
as

















The time structure is as follows. At the beginning, the agent learns his ini-
tial type θ1 ∈ Θ. Then, the principal offers a contract {p, ξθ} or equivalently
{U, ξθ}, which incorporates in every period t all possible type reports θt of the
agent and all possible histories ht−1 ∈ H t−1. U represents the vector U =
(U(θ1|h
0), . . . , U(θT |h
T−1)) of agent’s continuation utility. After the contract pro-
posal, the agent decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If he accepts, he
gives in a report θ1 and ξθ1(q
1) is realized. In the beginning of every later period
t > 1, the agent learns his new type drawn from f(θt|θt−1) and decides to con-
tinue or terminate the contract. If he continues, he gives in a new report θt and
ξθt(qt|q
t−1) is realized.
Since in every period, the agent can terminate the contract, the principal has
to take into account the IR-constraints in every period. If the agent terminates,




t−1) > 0, (2)
for all θt ∈ Θ, all h
t−1 ∈ H t−1 and all periods t ∈ T .
For the IC-constraints, in every period t ∈ T , the principal has to give incen-
tives to the agent to report his true type θt ∈ Θ instead of any other type ϑt ∈ Θ.
Since the history-path ht−1 only depends on previous type reports and not on
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previous true types, the IC-constraint IC(θt, ϑt|h

















for all θt, ϑt ∈ Θ, all h
t−1 ∈ H t−1 and all periods t ∈ T . Note that only one time
deviations have to be considered since after any deviation to ϑt, the highest future
continuation utility is given by U(θt+1|h
t−1, ϑt, qt) if all future IC-constraints are
fulfilled.

























is the aggregated continuation surplus and s(θt, qt) := u(θt, qt) − c(qt) the per-
period aggregated surplus in period t, for all t ∈ T , with S(θT+1|h
T ) := 0, for all
histories hT ∈ HT .
3 Optimal contracting under the first-order ap-
proach
As in Battaglini and Lamba (2017), I define the first-order approach as follows:
Definition 2. A contract is first-order optimal if and only if it is sufficient to
consider the relaxed problem, including only {IR(θt = θN |ht−1)}t∈T and {IC(θt =
θi, ϑt = θi+1|h
t−1)}t∈T , for all i ∈ I\{N}, and the other constraints can be
disregarded.
Following now the same arguments as in Battaglini and Lamba (2017), I get
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the following Lemma, which differs only to their result by allowing for stochastic
contracts.














V (θ, q)dξθ(q), (6)
where V (θ, q) :=
∑T−1
τ=0 δ
τv(θτ+1, qτ+1) captures the virtual surplus over the whole
time horizon T depending on reported types θ and occurred realizations of quan-
tities q and








∆u(θτ , qτ )
denotes the virtual surplus in period τ ∈ T .
With this representation, principal’s objective simplifies to a maximization
problem of V with respect to ξθ, which allows for any kind of mixing across
periods. Given that such a representation of principal’s objective exists, the static
proof of Strausz (2006) extends to dynamic environments, i.e. the principal gets
the maximal profit if she maximizes V with respect to q for every given θ ∈ ΘT .
Hence, for any q̂ ∈ argmaxq∈RT
+
V (θ, q), a contract with implementation function































Hence, stochastic contracts are at most as profitable for the principal as deter-
ministic contracts. This result is summarized in
Proposition 1. Consider a dynamic setting with T < ∞ periods in which the
first-order approach holds. Then, deterministic contracts are always superior
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than stochastic contracts.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Since the principal has full commitment to
her initially offered contract, she cannot react to history ht−1 ∈ H t−1 in any later
period t > 2. Therefore, the principal maximizes her expected discounted sum
of virtual surpluses V (θ, q) with respect to q ∈ RT+. Hence, she always prefers to
choose such quantities that maximize the expectation of V (θ, q) like q̂ ∈ RT+. If
there are multiple maximizers, she could randomize between them, but still, the
deterministic quantity q̂ would provide at least the same surplus to the principal.
Battaglini and Lamba (2017), however, already mention that the first-order
approach is often not justified, and they state the optimal deterministic contract
in a specific but enlightening example, which is even optimal in the wider set of
all stochastic contracts. In a more general setup, however, it could be with loss
of generality to restrict to deterministic contracts only.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that stochastic contracts do not yield higher profits to the
principal in dynamic contracting, if the first-order approach is valid. In situations
for which the first-order approach does not work, it remains an open question
whether stochastic contracts could yield higher profits to the principal. However,
a proper analysis of stochastic contracts in such environments is complicated,
since already no characteristic result of optimal deterministic contracts exists
when the first-order approach fails.
5 Appendix
To prove Lemma 1, I show first two necessary Lemmata:
Lemma 2. If the first-order approach is valid, the agent’s continuation utility
U(θt|h





















∆u(θt+τ , qt+τ ) dξθt+τ (qt+τ , . . . , qt|q
t−1),
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for all i ∈ I and all t ∈ T .
Proof of Lemma 2. Let t ∈ T , and ht−1 ∈ H t−1 be an arbitrary history-path.
Under the first-order approach, the IR-constraint is always binding for θN , i.e.
U(θt = θN |h
t−1) = 0.
Moreover, the IC-constraints are downward binding, i.e.
U(θt = θi|h














t−1, θt = θi+1, qt)dξ(θt−1,θt=θi+1)(qt|q
t−1),
for all i ∈ I\{N}. Plugging in recursively all binding IC-constraints for all






















t−1, θt = θj, qt)dξ(θt−1,θt=θj)(qt|q
t−1),
for all t ∈ T , and all histories ht−1 ∈ H t−1, whereby U(θT+1|h
T ) := 0 for all
histories hT ∈ HT . Now, I show the explicit representation of U(θt = θi|h
t−1)
by means of backward induction. The basis for t = T is given through the last




































































































































∆u(θt+τ , qt+τ ) dξθt+τ (qt+τ , . . . , qt|q
t−1),
for all i ∈ I.

Lemma 3. Under the first-order approach, the explicit representation of the con-
tinuation surplus S(θt|h


















s(θt+τ , qt+τ ) dξθt+τ (qt+τ , . . . , qt|q
t−1),
for all i ∈ I, all t ∈ T and all histories ht−1 ∈ H t−1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using again backward induction, the basis for t = T follows
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s(θt+τ , qt+τ ) dξθt+τ (qt+τ , . . . , qt|q
t−1).

Proof of Lemma 1. Now, it is easy to deduce Lemma 1 from Lemmata 2 and 3
by inserting U(θt = θi|h
t−1) and S(θt|h
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